Introduction
China is under increasing pressure to let her currency float. In this paper we draw on the experience of developing countries choice of exchange rate regime and its impact on economic performance to conjecture what may happen should China let her currency float.
It is commonly argued that under floating (or flexible) exchange rate an economy has a greater ability to adjust to external shocks, hence contributing to improved economic performance (e.g. Friedman (1957) , Meade (1951) ), while fixed or pegged exchange rate results in price distortion and misallocation of resources. Furthermore, Calvo (1999) and others have also argued that the need to defend a peg in the event of a negative external shock could lead to a significant rise in real interest rate and uncertainty as to the substainability of the regime, hence harm investment prospects. On the other hand, fixed exchange rate or exchange rate peg contributes to predictability and macro discipline.
It could reduce relative price volatility, reduce a country's vulnerability to speculative exchange rate fluctuations, hence lead to lower real interest rate and stronger growth performance as compared to an economy under flexible exchange rate. (Calvo (2000) , Frankel (1999) and Mundell (1990) ). Moreover, flexible exchange rate regime could amplify the negative effects of terms of trade shocks for countries where the private and public sectors have large foreign currency-dominated liabilities. Currency depreciation generated by the external shock could generate (large) increases in the value of the debt expressed in domestic currency which might trigger bankruptcies, and resulted in a reduction in the rate of growth.
Whether there exists a link between exchange rate regimes and growth is ultimately an empirical issue. Ghosh (1997) finds no systematic link between the two. On the other hand, Klein and Shambaugh (2004) show a large, significant effect of a fixed exchange rate on bilateral trade between a base country and a country that pegs to it. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzengger (2003) , Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2004) find that less flexible exchange 1 rate regimes are associated with slower growth, as well as with greater output volatility for developing countries, but do not have any significant impact on growth for industrial countries. Husain, Mody and Rogoff (2004) find that for relatively poor countries with little access to international capital markets, pegged exchange rate regimes have relatively low inflation and relatively high exchange rate regime durability. For advanced economics, flexible exchange rate systems yield somewhat higher growth without higher inflation. For emerging markets, the exchange rate regimes does not appear to have a systematic effect on inflation or growth. This paper uses a more general model specification that encompasses those previously specified as special cases to help resolve this dispute. We shall also rely on our parameter estimates derived from the experience of developing counties to conjecture what might have happened to China's economic growth if China moves to flexible exchange rate. In section 2 we present the basic model. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the results for developing countries and uses the empirical estimates from developing counties to conjecture what might happen to China if exchange rate regime changes. Conclusions are in section 5.
The Model
A simple framework to analyze the impact of exchange rate regimes on economic growth is to assume a baseline growth equation for country i at time t taking the form
where y denotes the growth rate, x are determinants of growth such as those specified by Levine and Renelt (1992) , Barro (1991) , d is the dummy for the exchange rate regime with 1 for pegged exchange rate regime and 0 for flexible exchange rate regime, and denotes the zero mean error term that are assumed independent of x and d. Then whether exchange rate regime affects a country's growth conditional on x depends on the regression estimate of δ being significantly different from zero or not.
Model (2.1) assumes that the choice of exchange rate regime is independent of a country's growth rate.However, choices of exchange rate regimes could be made simultaneously with changes in macroeconomic variables. To allow for the possibility that d may be endogenous, we may assume that the exchange rate regime choice is determined by
and
where z denotes the determinants for exchange rate regime and v denotes the error term independent of z and x. If v and are correlated, consistent estimate of δ may be obtained by jointly estimating (2.1) -(2.3). Equation (2.1) essentially assumes that apart from a level change (given by δ) the optimal decision rules of economic agents conditional on x in an economy are invariant under different exchange rate regimes. It is conceivable that regime changes can lead to modification of the behavioral parameters because optimal decision rules vary with changes in structures (e.g. Lucas (1976) ). For instance, according to Ghosh, et.al. (1997) the investment to GDP ratio was about one percent higher in countries with pegged exchange rates than with flexible exchange rates. If behavior of economic agents stay the same conditional on investment and exchange rate regime a country chose, one would expect that other things being equal the growth rate of countries with pegged exchange rates would be higher than countries with flexible exchange rates. However, according to Ghosh et.al. countries operating under floating rates grow about 1 percent faster compared to countries operating under pegged exchange rates. As a matter of fact, economists have argued that although pegged exchange rates reduce policy uncertainties including exchange rate variability, but may also exacerbate protectionist pressures. On the other hand, flexible exchange rates could lead to expectation of lower quantity violation. With changing expectations, economic agents optimal decision rules may change also. To allow for changing 3 behavioral patterns under different exchange rate regime, we assume that the baseline growth equation for country i at time t under pegged exchange rate regime is given by
and under flexible exchange rate is given by Under model (2.4) -(2.5), the effect of regime changes is given by
(2.6) However, we do not simultaneously observe y 1 it and y 0 it . What we do observe is
are different from zero, regressions of (2.4) using pegged exchange rate regime data and (2.5) using flexible exchange rate regime data will give biased estimates of (α 1 , β 1 ) and (α 0 , β 0 ).
If and v are uncorrelated
it ) and
2) -(2.5) is reduced to the commonly specified model (2.1). However, these are testable hypotheses.
Data
We use panel data from 1974 -1994 of Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, For the growth regression, the dependent variable is annual growth rate of real per capita GDP in US$ . The regressors we consider are: log of initial real per capita GDP in US$, lagged by one period, measure level of economic development, a negative coefficient would support the conditional convergence hypothesis; terms of trade shock, measured as% change in terms of trade (terms of trade is defined as the ratio of export unit price to import unit price) and their lag by one period; investment to GDP ratio, lagged by one period; consumption -share of government consumption in GDP, lagged by one period;
openness -imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP, lagged by one period; grossgross private capital flow as % of GDP, a measure of financial openness, lagged by one period; human capital as measured by primary school enrollment rate, 5-year backward moving average to remove missing data; and secondary school enrollment rate, 5-year backward moving average to remove missing data; and regional dummies: Asia, Africa, Latin America (use middle eastern countries as benchmark). The interest rate variable is the 6-month London interbank rate (LIBOR).
For the determination of exchange rate regimes the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for pegged exchange rate regime and 0 otherwise. For the determinants, we use peg dummy lagged by one period; last period black market premium, a measure of exchange rate misalignment, lagged by one period; terms of trade shock lag by one period; openness defined as imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP, lagged by one period; reserves over GDP, lagged by one period; volatility of reserves, lagged by one period, computed as the standard deviation of monthly reserves over that period's mean serve; lagged inflation rate based on CPI or GDP deflation in case CPI is not available;
log of real GDP in US$ , lagged by one period, measures the size of the economy; log of lagged GDP; and lagged backward 5-year moving average of real GDP growth.
For the classification of exchange rate regimes, we shall use a. de jure classification by IMF: peg=1 if single currency peg or composite peg; 0 otherwise. b. natural classification by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) . R&R classification scheme relies on a broad variety of descriptive statistics on exchange rate inflation, and detailed country chronologies to group episodes into 14 fine grids and 5 coarse grids of regimes. In our study, we are not interested in treating the high inflation cases separately. We therefore reclassify observations in the freely-falling category into the other 14 categories using information on secondary classification from the country chronologies prepared by R&R, regardless of the inflation rate and the nature of currency crisis. After the reclassification, the peg dummy is set to one if coarse grid takes the value of one. 
Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of real per capital GDP growth of our data. Table 2 presents the ordinary least squares estimates of (2.1). Table 3 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of model (2.1) -(2.3). Table 4 presents least squares estimates of (2.4) and (2.5). Table 5 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of model (2.2) -(2.5). Table 6 presents the results of testing model 1 ((2.1)) against model 2 ((2.1) -(2.3)), model 1 against model 3 ((2.2) -(2.5)) and model 1 against model 3.
It is clear from these tables that the results are indeed highly sensitive to the way exchange rate regimes are classified. However, some general pictures also appear no matter which classification is used: First, our results appear to favor model 3 as a maintained hypothesis. Second, government consumption had no direct effect on private productivity, but lowered growth through the distorting effects from taxation or government-expenditure programs (e.g. Barro and Xavier (1995) 1974-1993, or 1980-1993 or 1993 . The IMF or LY&S classification suggest that should China switch from pegged to floating rate, China's growth rate might be reduced by 1.5 to 2 percentage point.
On the other hand, R&R classification suggests the reverse outcome which could lead to an increase of growth rate by about 5 percent. However, the predicted growth rates under pegged rate are so far off from China's actual, the validity of this inference based on R&R classification is quite doubtful.
Conclusions
A number of developing countries have experienced currency crises with severe costs in the past three decades. There are extensive debates about systems for achieving both exchange rate stability and domestic price stability to prevent crises. It is often argued that economies cannot have capital mobility, independent monetary policy, price and exchange rate stability simultaneously. In this paper we have developed a more complete model specifications that encompasses specifications used in previous studies to focus on the impact of exchange rate regime on economic growth. Based on the experience of developing countries, we found holding investment, openness, government consumption constant, countries following a pegged rate rather than floating rate tend to grow 1.5 -2 percent faster in terms of IMF and LY&S classification but yields reverse projection in terms of R&R classification.
However we must caution the over-generalization of this study. Our study only focuses on one aspect of an economy. We have not looked at many other aspects of the outcomes associated with exchange rate regime changes such as the effects of shocks (speculative attacks) on international payments, pass-through of exchange rate changes to consumer import prices, inflation, legal and judicial systems, market based disciplines, the entry of foreign banks, capital controls, financial liberalizations, or other aggregative activities and their volatility. The lack of exchange rate adjustments under a peg could result in serious price distortion and misallocation of resources. Moreover, pegs could be more likely subject to speculative attacks, hence induce higher output volatility. Before the 1997 East Asian financial crises, all the crises countries followed a de factor dollar-pegged system. Government budgets were more or less balanced. Inflation rates were manageable.
Financial markets were buoyant for the assets of the countries in question and therefore by major inflows of capital (the GDP growth rate for South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand in 1996 are 7.1%, 8%, 8.6%, 5.5%, respectively, and the inflation rate is 4.9%, 7.9%, 3.5% and 5.9%, respectively). However, when domestic currencies became over valued because of higher domestic inflation than the US and the rise of the dollar vis-á-vie major industrialized currencies, notably the Japanese yen and the German duetschemark, the weak domestic financial system, excessive unhedged foreign borrowing by the domestic private sector, and a lack of transparency about the ties among government, business, and banks caused investors to abruptly changed their attitudes, leading to bouts of panic and massive outflow of capital. The sudden interruption of capital flows unleashed a profound crisis in domestic financial system and productive sectors. Floating exchange rate has the advantage that relevant information becomes available promptly to allow market to operate efficiently and there is less chance for a country subjecting to speculative attack.
However, the cost of transition to the floating region could be high if there are serious banking and financial sector weakness (e.g. Summers (2000)). Given hedging instruments such as currency futures and options are not fully available in China and China's relative inexperience in handling sudden large capital flows and imperfect information, perhaps instead of converting to a completely free flexible exchange rate regime, a "closely managed flexible system" focusing on stabilizing RMB against a currency basket that have weights directly proportional to the currencies of China's major trading partners might be a more suitable and sustainable alternative in the near future. 
